WAR EXPERIENCES ON THE USS PORTERFIELD

by Harry S. Johnson

 

      After writing my autobiography, I showed the rough draft to my cousin, Stanton Verret, and he suggested that I include more about my experiences in the Navy during WWII. I had kept a diary while I was assigned to the USS Porterfield, DD682; fortunately, I still have it to use for reference. When I started the diary, I planned to use it only to maintain a record of the dates and places the ship took part in during the course of the war.  Sometimes, I would enter a few details of the engagements with the enemy. As the war progressed those kinds of details were entered more often, oftentimes relating to incidents that did not involve my ship's direct involvement.

 

      So with my diary at hand and a history of the Porterfield that one of the ship's officers wrote I'll attempt to tell of these experiences. I suspect that what follows will not be much about me as an individual but about the USS Porterfield, which took me along to do my part to help win the war. My assignment aboard ship was for the operation and maintenance of the gyro compass and the various interior communication systems necessary for ship operation at sea.  Some of the other things that I was responsible for were the telephone system and the intercoms.

 

      I had just finished attending gyro compass school in San Diego when I was assigned to the Porterfield as the gyro compass electrician. In August 1943, I went to San Pedro, California to join the ship still in the Bethlehem Steel shipbuilding yard. It was a 2100 ton destroyer and would not be ready for commissioning for another two or three months. This gave me time to familiarize myself with my equipment and my new shipmates. I was eligible for liberty most every night and when I did go on liberty, I would usually go to Los Angeles or Long Beach.  Within a short time, I developed a close friendship with "Doggie" Henderson, from Alta Vista, Virginia.  Doggie's previous ship was the USS Strong,  a destroyer that was sunk in one of the Solomon Island campaigns during 1942.  We were among the few of the crew that had previous sea duty in the Navy. When we were at sea, we would often sit upon the ship's forecastle and discuss our previous Navy experiences or our boyhood days or "religion".  I guessed we discussed religion more than anything.  The one subject that I knew very little about.  I always played the Devil's advocate and argued against most points he would try to make concerning religious beliefs.   When in port, we most always went on liberty together.  Usually, we would go to a bar for a few drinks, then to a movie or show of some kind. A few times, we went to one of the clubs or dance halls in Hollywood, such as the Palladium.  At the time, I believe that my sister, Ruth was working at one of the aircraft plants in the area, so once or twice I would visit with her. It's possible that I only saw her while I was in Gyro School. I remember Mom coming out to see her and I got to visit with them both whenever that was.  I remember going to a carnival with them in Long Beach.

 

PORTERFIELD COMMISSIONED

 

      We commissioned the Porterfield on October 30, 1943 and began our "shakedown cruise" between San Pedro and San Diego. The shakedown provided the crew with some training in our assignments and to discover and correct problems that were overlooked during construction. After everything looked shipshape, we headed West for the War Zones. My first diary entry was made on January 12, 1944 and says, "Left San Diego." Many crew members began to lose their sense of well being as well as their earlier meal. For some, this went on for several days. I was fortunate in that respect for I never became seasick during my entire naval career.  I don't remember the number of ships in that first convoy but I expect that there were a half dozen or so. Anyway, my next diary entry was on Jan. 18 when we arrived Lahaina Roads, Hawaii.  The crew was seldom told what our next destination would be; if I learned this kind of information, it would be from the ship's "scuttlebutt" or "rumor mill"; usually a source of "bum dope".  Well, we left Hawaiian waters the next day not knowing where we were headed for, except we knew it was in a westerly direction.  There were now some large capital ships such as battleships, cruisers, carriers and destroyers in the formation.  On January 28, we crossed the International Dateline and set the time up to January 29. Also, scuttlebutt had it that we were headed for Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Island chain for a landing by Marines.

 

MARSHALL ISLANDS CAMPAIGN

 

      January 31, 1944: we arrived at Kwajalein Atoll and commenced bombardment of the island in support with battleships and cruisers.  We are in at close range and they are several miles further out. The sound of their salvos going overhead gave one an eerie feeling.  We stayed at general quarters (GQ) for about 36 hours, firing our 5 inch guns for a big part of that time.  Very little rest or sleep was obtained while at GQ.  My battle station is the IC Room with the gyro compass and interior communications systems.  The IC Room was located below decks in one of the least vulnerable positions on the ship.  It also contained the gunnery fire control computer and was manned by two or three men,  so I was never alone during GQ. I spent most of my time during GQ (and while on watch) reading or listening in on the headphones to what was being said between the various gunnery positions.  I had access to all communications systems on the ship.  My biggest disappointments were from the fact that I seldom got to see firsthand the action taking place top side, but I took comfort in the fact that I was located in a relatively safe place in case of an attack.

 

Meanwhile, the Marines landed on Kwajalein to engage the enemy and capture the island. Also, we fired on Roi and Namur islands before landings were launched in those places.  By February 4, enemy resistance had nearly ended so we left the area with other destroyers escorting some Navy transport ships southward.  February 9, we arrived Funafuti, Ellis Islands. February 11, left Funafuti with the destroyer Fletcher escorting three merchant ships to Majuro,  Marshall Islands.  February 15, arrived Majuro.  After arriving there we learned that an American pilot had spotted our convoy and reported that he engaged an enemy convoy headed for Majuro and that he had made strafing run on the convoy and that it returned fire towards him. We did spot a plane during our trip but identified it as friendly. Also, we conducted some gunnery practice during the trip.  I would have hated to have been that pilot when he faced the truth from his commander.  I imagine that he learned an important lesson about his job and the necessity for telling the truth.

 

February 18, left Majuro to head for Hunter Island near Jaluit to search for some downed American aviators who crashed near the island.  After arriving there, we searched all around the island waters but did not go ashore as the Japanese had some forces there.   We could see people on the island but were unable to determine whether or not they were Japanese.  February 19, arrived Majuro without making a rescue.   February 20, joined a Task Group of battleships, cruisers and destroyers to bombard more islands in the Marshalls.  This time Taroa, Wotje Atoll, Malealop islands would be the targets. The BB’s hurled more than 64 tons of 14" salvos at the islands. February 23, arrived Majuro.

 

February 28, left Majuro for Pearl Harbor.  March 6, arrived Pearl.  The crew was granted liberty in Honolulu.  Doggie and I made the usual rounds at the bars,  then took in a movie or went to Waikai Beach for relaxation.  The ship took on ammunition, fuel and stores, then left Pearl on March 15, to join up with Task Force 58.2,  which consisted of a fast carrier force of modern battleships, heavy cruisers, large carriers and fast destroyers.  March 20, arrived Majuro. Joined a destroyer squadron just newly formed with other destroyers like our self. March 22, left Majuro with a Task Group of light carriers, light cruisers,  tankers and destroyers.  Our force was to supply fuel to the fast carrier force participating in carrier strikes against Yap, Palau, Swate and other islands in the Carolines during the coming weeks.

 

March 23, at sea, crossed the International Date Line (IDL) and traveling along the Equator. March 27, 150 miles off New Ireland.  March 31, about 70 miles off Admiralty Islands.  April 3, about 60 miles off Mussan Island. This group had not made contact with the enemy, although we went to GQ numerous times, which I imagine was from doubtful submarine or aircraft contacts. April 6, crossed IDL and set the time back to April 5. Arrived  Majuro this date.  April 12, left Majuro with same Task Group as before and tracked a similar course along the Equator and crossed the IDL April 14 and set time to April 15.  April 17, off Mussan Island about 30 miles. April 20 entered Seeadler Harbor, in the Admiralties. We stayed there a couple days.  While there, we could hear artillery fire back in the hills as the Army was still engaged in defeating enemy forces on the island.  April 22, left to provide screening support for the fast carrier force. Returned to Seeadler Harbor April 27.  Out to sea again on April 28, heading East.  Crossed the IDL May 3 and changed time to May 2.

 

May 9, arrived Pearl Harbor.  We were in and out of Pearl several times during the three week period we were in the area. I imagine that we were granted liberty in Honolulu, but I don’t remember any details.  May 30, left Pearl heading West.  Our destroyer squadron was assigned a permanent position in the screening forces surrounding the fast carrier force.  June 4, set time to June 5, as we crossed the IDL. June 5, arrived Eniwetok Atoll at the Western end of the Marshalls.

 

MARIANAS CAMPAIGN

 

June 11, left Eniwetok, screening the fast carrier Task Force 58.2 and heading for Saipan to soften it up with bombardment prior to landings by the Marines.  June 15, arrived Saipan area at 6:16 PM a large force of enemy planes attacked the Task Force. Our carrier patrol planes knocked out most of the attackers, but a few planes got thru to the Task Force.  All planes were shot down by the ships in the group.  This was our baptism to aircraft attacks; I don't think we scored any kills, but we did contribute in the harassment of the enemy as he came in on his runs.  The enemy planes scored no hits on the Task Force.  June 17, 18, still off Saipan and endured two more attacks by enemy aircraft.  Our ships did get some damage this time, but no ships were sunk.

 

June 29, entered Saipan Harbor, but did not anchor or stay there very long.  We were able to observe some of the fighting up close while in the harbor.  We watched the assault boats as they approached the island and worried about them taking fire as they landed.  They seemed to me to get on the beach unmolested, but as they moved off the beach head, they drew fire from the enemy. Apparently, our bombardment caused the Japs to withdraw from the beaches during the time we were bombarding, thus allowing our troops to land with relative safety. Sure was glad to be on the Porterfield instead of being with those Marines in the landing forces.  We moved back out to the Task Force after a couple hours. During the next several days we were attacked by enemy planes daily.  Often our planes would run out of fuel when returning from their missions and while waiting their turn to land on their carrier.  When out of fuel, they would have to ditch in the sea and usually they would ditch close to a destroyer so they wouldn't have to be in the water too long.  We picked up several pilots during this time.

 

June 29, left Saipan area. July 2, arrived Eniwetok.  We were having problems with our sonar equipment, so we entered the floating dry dock there to make repairs to the sonar gear. July 8, left Eniwetok.  July 11, arrive Saipan and entered Lamapag Harbor for fuel.  We observed artillery flashes where the Marines were bombarding Tinian Island across the strait from Saipan. We remained in the harbor until August 1.  We were never harassed by enemy planes during our stay in Saipan this time.  Now we joined up with two large carrier forces that were combined into one Task Force, which was called Task Force 38 under Admiral Halsey's command and Task Force 58 under Admiral Spruance's command.

 

August 2, arrived Guam area to support landings there by the Marines to retake the Islands from the Japs. Guam is the only American territory occupied by the Japanese except for a few islands in the Aleutians. At 9:30 PM, we made sonar contact with a submarine and began dropping depth charges. After a short time, we lost contact and were unable to determine if we scored a hit or not.  Arrived back in Saipan the morning of August 4, left Saipan same day at 7:00 PM.

 

August 6, joined up with Task Force 58, operating in the area of Guam. August 13, arrived Eniwetok.  The crew was allowed to go ashore on Mug Island for a beer party and/or to play softball. We stayed at Eniwetok for several weeks of recreation time.  On one of my days ashore I swam out to a Japanese cargo ship that had been sunk in the harbor before we occupied the atoll.   After arriving at the ship I found that I couldn't climb up on the superstructure as there were no ladders or lines hanging over the sides to climb up with.  But I noticed hundreds of pieces of ammunition on the harbor bottom all around the ship.  Apparently, it was carrying this ammunition when it was attacked and it blew up. I dove down to the bottom of the atoll and recovered a couple pieces of ammo and took them back to the Porterfield with me as souvenirs.  Since the ammo was still live, I took the precaution of disarming them.  I still have these pieces at home.

 

PHILIPPINES CAMPAIGN

 

August 29, left Eniwetok as part of Task Force 38. September 1, crossed Equator several times during the next several days.  September 6,  our planes made their first strike on Palau,  an island in the Carolines.  Air strikes were continued for the next couple days. September 8, left Palau to carry out air strikes on Mindanao in the Philippines.  September 9, arrived Mindanao area and launched our planes at 10:00 AM while 50 miles off Mindanao.  Scuttlebutt had it that two cruisers and four destroyers were dispatched from the Task Force to intercept 43 Jap ships steaming in Davao Gulf. Also, I heard that our air strikes on Mindanao resulted in 42 planes destroyed on the ground, 15 ships were left burning.  No reports on the Davao Gulf operation, except that the USS Laws picked up two POWs.  September 10, returned to Palau to refuel.  September 12, back in the Philippines to make aircraft attacks on Samar, Cebu, Negros, Panay and Leyte Islands.  Cebu Harbor was the major target of the air strike.  The weather was cloudy, misty and raining at our station.  Enemy planes made several attempts to attack the carrier force, but were repelled by our planes patrolling the Task Force.  One enemy plane was able to get through and drop his bomb.  The carrier Essex reported a near miss but no damage.  The enemy plane was downed by the Task Force's AA before he could escape.  Results of the Cebu attack were reported as follows:

 

§         272 - 277 planes destroyed on the air fields

§         156 planes destroyed in the air

§         Ships sunk:  2 AKs, 1 AP, 2 DEs, 20 smaller craft

§         Ships probable sunk:  5 AKs, 1 oiler, 30 small craft, 20 sampans

 

September 14, left for Palau to provide air support for the landing planned for September 15.  September 19, left Palau for the Philippines.

 

September 21, launched air strikes for targets on Luzon. Bad weather over the targets and at sea. The main targets were Clark Field and shipping in Manila Bay.  We are cruising 30 to 50 miles East of Luzon. Enemy planes in the area all day keeping us at GQ for 8 ½ hours. No damage reported from enemy strikes against the Task Force.  September 22,  GQ at 4:30 AM because of enemy air attacks on the Task Force. Secured from GQ at 9:00 AM. Two enemy planes downed by the Task Force; no damage to any ships.  Commander Task Force 38 (Admiral Halsey) sent a bulletin into the Task Force which read:

 

"Sept. 22, 0849, Another commendation to the officers and men of this Task Force for a job well done X  In the attack on Luzon, our pilots and air crews hit the enemy another disastrous blow in spite of hazardous weather X  The incomplete score shows 144 planes shot down and 140 destroyed on ground X  35 ships sunk and 27 damaged and probable sunk many destructive hits on air strips and harbor installations they cannot stop you X"

 

Another message from Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal:

 

"Sept. 22, 2025:  For delivery to Admiral William F. Halsey X You are living up to your reputation for smacking the Japs. The Navy Dept. is proud of the latest exploits of the Third Fleet X  I send my congratulations to you and the men who participated in these successful operations X  To Commander in Chief Pacific Ocean Area."

 

Left the Luzon area to refuel. 

 

September 24, returned to the Luzon area about 20 miles off its Southern tip.  Launched our planes to attack installations in this area.  One enemy plane splashed near the carrier Lexington. We were not at GQ at the time the plane was downed; don't know why we were not at GQ. September 25, left the area for Palau.

 

September 27, arrived Palau and anchored in Kossol Passage, which is located between Babelthuap and Kayangel Islands (both Jap held). Peleliu is about 60 miles South.  September 28; October 1, we left Palau and returned four times during this period.  October 1, left Palau for Ulithi as the Japanese had abandoned that Atoll and went to Yap Island.  October 2, arrived Ulithi anchorage during a tropical storm.  Many ships in the anchorage began dragging anchor because of the storm.   Quite a number of ships had lost their boats and suffered other minor damage. So a decision was made for the fleet to ride out the storm at sea.  The Porterfield was having no problems but left with the fleet as ordered.  The storm drifted north and we returned to Ulithi October 4, to take on fuel and provisions.

 

OKINAWA AND FORMOSA CAMPAIGN

 

October 6, left Ulithi for Okinawa and Formosa.  October 7, we caught up with the typhoon we had encountered a few days before and again encountered heavy swells and foul weather conditions.  We were hoping to draw the Japanese Fleet out to engage her in a fight as we headed closer to Japan.  Apparently, it remained in hiding as we arrived in the Okinawa Area to launch air strikes against the island on October 10.  Weather conditions were now favorable with a calm sea.  Tokyo Rose reported that they sunk a carrier, a cruiser and two destroyers while we attacked the area.  Although we were at GQ much of the time, we were not attacked once by their planes.  During their raid, our planes reported sinking 1 sub tender, 1 medium AK, 1 destroyer, 10 small AKs, 5 coastal vessels, 18 smaller craft; probable sunk 2 medium AKs, 2 small AKs, 20 coastal and smaller craft; 14 planes destroyed in the air and 75 destroyed on the ground.  One of the pilots reported, "Airfield on Yoro Shima still operational, but Japanese fire insurance is sure to go up.  No buildings left to insure." October 10, left Nansei Islands after nightfall for Formosa Area.

 

October 12, about 50 miles off Formosa.  Our aircraft reported heavy opposition as they pressed their attack on the shipping and airfields.  They reported destroying 124 planes in the air and 29 planes on the ground as well as some shipping damage.  We lost about 20 aircraft during their first engagement.  The Task Force was attacked by enemy planes several times but were turned back or shot down by our air patrols before they reached our position.  Enemy air activity sent us to GQ at 6:30 PM where we remained all night. They dropped flares, which lit up the Task Force pretty well.  While we were illuminated, they would send in torpedo planes to attack us.  They made numerous torpedo plane attacks during the night, but without any success on their part.  The destroyer Prichett was raked with gun fire from one of the carriers while it was firing at an attacking plane. Seven men on the Prichett were seriously wounded.  October 13, secured from GQ at 7:00 AM and were free of further attack until nightfall. Back at GQ at 6: 30 PM with the Japs repeating their attacks of the previous evening.  Only this time, they were more successful, the cruisers Houston and Canberra were both struck by torpedoes during the night.  Both had to be taken in tow as their engine rooms were damaged. October 14, moving to the Okinawa area again.  (Guess maybe it was safer there.)  During the day we had to rescue a pilot who ditched along side us. He was badly burned from contact with aviation fuel while he was in the water.  His skin peeled off as we attempted to wash him off.

 

During the morning, BM3c Tomoskovic was washed overboard while working on the forecastle. We spent several hours searching for him but were unable to find him.  At 3:00 PM, at GQ again as the Task Force was under attack by 14 torpedo planes.  The light cruiser Reno claims to have shot down six of the planes as they pressed their attack in her direction. One of the enemy planes crashed into the Reno's stern section causing many casualties and much damage. The Reno also reported seeing a torpedo wake passing close astern.  Apparently the sea was pretty rough at the time because the Alabama reported losing a man overboard.  The Porterfield was given credit for downing one of the enemy torpedo planes.

 

October 15, secured from GQ around 1:00 AM and headed further out to sea to refuel. Scuttlebutt said that the Jap fleet was headed to intercept the Houston and Canberra,  which were now under tow by fleet tugs.  We headed in that direction too, hoping to meet the Jap Fleet.  October 16, we were about 300 miles South of Okinawa and were attacked by a few enemy planes in a fight that lasted only about 15 minutes.  Our planes had spotted an enemy force of several converted carriers, a cruiser and several destroyers about 450 miles from us.  By nightfall, we had closed the distance between us to 300 miles.  Went to GQ at 6:00 PM expecting more plane attacks.  October 17, during the night we lost contact with the Jap Fleet.  Scuttlebutt later indicated that the Jap Fleet is reorganizing into a larger force of 5 battleships, 6 carriers, 4 light carriers, 12 light cruisers, 3 heavy cruisers and 21 destroyers. A force in numbers much larger than us. During the day, we sank a floating mine with our 20 mm guns as we passed nearby.  During the day, we were given the assignment of passing mail from the States to various other ships in the Task Force.  During the mail exchange with the battleship South Dakota, we collided with her while along side, damage was negligible to either ship.  Scuttlebutt said that the Houston and Canberra are about 100 miles from us and making only about 3 knots, with tugs having them in tow. The Houston apparently received three torpedo hits and may have to be scuttled before arriving in Pearl.  There was another report that the Wichita has received two torpedo hits but was still operating under her own power.

 

October 18, fueled at sea and now about 300 miles off Luzon. No reports drifting around about the Jap Fleet; perhaps they had retired for good, but don't think too much about that, there’s more to come later.  More landings took place on a couple small islands between Luzon and Minandao.  October 20, large scale landings were made on Leyte this date.  The Task Force planes provided air support for these landings.  Japanese radio reported we lost 11 carriers, 1 battleship, 4 cruisers and 1 destroyer; damaged were 8 carriers, 2 battleships, 5 cruisers and 1 destroyer. They named the engagement: "The Battle of Formosa".

 

October 21, about 25 miles off Samar Island, Philippines. At 6:00 PM a message from Radio Honolulu. To all Pacific Ocean Area:

 

"It is with great pride that Com CPOA transmits the following message from our Commander in Chief President Roosevelt;  "X  Personal from the President; X The country has followed with pride the magnificent sweep of your fleet into enemy waters X  In addition to the gallant fighting of your flyers X  We appreciate the endurance and super seamanship of your forces X  Your fine cooperation with General MacArthur furnishes another example of teamwork and the effectiveness and intelligent use of all weapons  X  To the officers and men of all Services who have carried the fight to the enemy and to those who planned and have supplied the needs of the fighting forces through the years is due the credit which prompted the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy to send his message X To all officers and men, "Well Done”.”

 

October 23, fueled at sea about 200 miles off Samar. October 24, launched planes at dawn to strike the Luzon area.  GQ at 8:00 AM, about 60 to 70 enemy planes attacked the Task Force, but most were downed or repelled before reaching the Task Force. At 10:16 AM, a lone dive bomber scored a hit on the carrier Princeton, setting her afire from ruptured aviation fuel tanks on the hanger deck.  She maintained her speed to remain within the screening umbrella provided to protect the Task Force from air attacks.  About one half hour after being hit, the fire had spread to almost wholly engulf the ship in flames.  Numerous violent explosions were observed from bombs and ammunition going off. The destroyer Morrison went along side the Princeton to rescue some of the personnel trapped by the flames. The Morrison's mast became entangled in the Princeton's stacks and caused the mast to snap off. The cruiser Birmingham also went along side the Princeton to rescue personnel. While along side, the Princeton’s after bomb rack exploded, which damaged two 5 inch guns on the Birmingham and killed 89 men and injured about 200 others.  The cruiser Reno went along side to rescue personnel and while there damaged some of her 40 mm guns.  The destroyer Erwin went alongside to rescue more men and while along side her main engine became fouled somehow, putting the engine out of commission.  With all of the Princeton's crew rescued,  the Task Force pulled away from her because she was considered unsalvageable. Rescue ships stayed with her and sank her after sunset.  The Porterfield was credited with shooting down one of the many attacking enemy planes that day. At sunset, a squadron of battleships, cruisers and destroyers left the Task Force to intercept a Jap Force of 2 battleships, 8 cruisers and 13 destroyers.  We remained at GQ until after midnight.

 

October 25, still at GQ.  At dawn our planes were launched to strike the enemy force about 100 miles ahead of us.  Our planes report that the Jap Force consists of 2 battleships, 8 cruisers, 1 CV,  2 CVLs, 1 CVE and 13 destroyers.  The first air strike reported sinking 1 CV and damaging 2 other carriers and one of the battleships.  At 4:00 PM, the Porterfield joined with a Task Group of 4 cruisers and 10 destroyers whose purpose was to go in and finish off the damaged Japanese units.  At 6:00 PM, we witnessed one of our cruisers firing on a CVL and setting it ablaze.  The CVL sank before our range was close enough to open fire.  We passed over the spot where the CVL sank and could see men and debris afloat in the water. We did not attempt to pick up any POWs as we were pursuing the remaining enemy units still afloat. At 7:00 PM, three targets were reported to be 21,000 yards from us.  Some of our cruisers had opened fire on them, scoring a hit on one.  Several of our destroyers were sent in to lay down a torpedo spread.  I heard that 15 torpedoes were fired without scoring a hit. Our cruiser continued firing at its target and had engrossed it in flames.  The Porterfield was ordered into make a torpedo spread on the burning unit.  We had closed our range to 3,000 yards and had not drawn any fire from the unit. As we approached the range at which we planned to launch our torpedoes, the enemy unit disappeared from our radar screen.  I watched it disappear on our radar monitor in the IC Room.  It had sunk!  The destroyers were running low on fuel, so it was decided to abandon the chase to get the remaining units.  We joined the main Task Force and took on fuel the next morning with the rest of the squadron.

 

October 26, fueled.  Message from Admiral Fischer, Com Task Force 38.3 to Task Force 38.3: 

 

"Yesterday's action and the day before made history that will stand in the annals of the American Navy as long as there is a Navy X  This Task Force bore the brunt of the enemy's all out air attack and wiped out the cream of his carrier and shore based air power X  During and following this and in spite of the loss of the gallant Princeton we contributed our share with the other Task Groups to completely rout the Japanese Navy and the destruction of its major portion X With justifiable pride in the forces under my command I say,  Well Done, which words seem inadequate to express what is in my heart X Time: Oct. 26, 0300."

 

October 28, left Philippines Area for Ulithi. Message from Commander US Naval Forces in Europe: "Heartiest congratulations to all hands over there from all hands over here on your great victories."  October 29, Tokyo radio reports that we lost a total of 57 ships in the "Battle of the Philippines" consisting of 19 carriers, 7 battleships, etc. Actually, we lost 1 light carrier, 2 escort carriers, 2 destroyers (Johnston and Goff) and 1 destroyer escort.  All of those American ships lost except the light carrier, Princeton, were in Admiral Kinkaid's Task Force operating in the Leyte Gulf supporting landing forces in the area.  In a radio address to the American public, President Roosevelt said that it was the greatest Naval defeat ever suffered by the Japs. October 30, arrived Ulithi for more beer parties and relaxation.

 

November 1, left Ulithi to sortie near Samar and hit the enemy in the Philippines some more.  November 3, fueled at sea in the AM.  The light cruiser Reno reported striking a floating mine, causing one engine room to be flooded. She had to drop out of the formation with a bad list. One destroyer is staying with her as a screen while returning to Ulithi. November 4, scuttlebutt had it that the Jap's air force now consisted mostly of suicide pilots that planed to crash their planes into our ships, with destroyers screening the large task forces being their major targets. November 5, 80 miles off Luzon and launched our planes to strike the Manila Area on Luzon.  GQ at 1:30 PM, with bogies threatening the Task Force.  A suicide plane crashed into the Lexington’s bridge, killing 15 men and injuring many others.  The Ticonderoga reported a suicide plane just barely missed her, crashing into the sea nearby.  Weather conditions were producing heavy swells.  An American pilot had to ditch near us; the rough seas made it too dangerous to go along side the pilot and fetch him from the sea An American pilot had to ditch near us; the rough seas made it too dangerous to go along side the pilot and fetch him from the sea as we usually did in calmer waters. We had to launch a life boat to rescue him.

 

November 5, more air strikes on the Luzon Area again. Left the area at dusk each day.  November 7, fueling at sea very difficult because bad weather and rough seas; about the worst seas I had ever been in. November 8, a destroyer in the Task Force reported losing their Executive Officer overboard and was unable to find him during their search for him.  We're now standing off the Philippines several hundred miles while riding out the storm.  November 11, eleventh birthday of my brother, Tommy.  Back in Philippine waters and fueled. At GQ 12:30 to 5:00 PM with bogeys in the area.  November 12, left area to refuel. November 13, back in Philippine waters to launch strikes against Japanese landing reinforcements on Leyte.  November 15, left the area for Ulithi.

 

November 17, arrived Ulithi and went into dry dock for repairs to our sonar gear. Nov. 20, still in dry dock. A tanker was torpedoed as it was entering the harbor and sank near the harbor entrance around  5:30 AM.  All destroyers and DEs got underway to search for the submarine.  The destroyers patrolled inside the harbor dropping depth charges along side all capital ships anchored within the harbor.  One sub was found and sunk around 6:00 AM.  Another sub was reported sunk inside the harbor. A third sub was reported to have surfaced just outside the harbor apparently unable to submerge.  It was sunk by a destroyer. All subs were believed to be the 2 man type operating out of Yap, 200 miles from Ulithi.  During the day we were wondering what might have happened to us if the dry dock had been torpedoed while we were in it.  I'm glad to say that we didn't have to find out!  November 22, left Ulithi for the Philippines.

 

November 24, arrived in Luzon Area and launched air strikes against enemy installations in the area.  At GQ all day from numerous bogey reports during the day. Several times they penetrated the Task Force's defenses and would make bombing and torpedo runs on our forces. The carrier Essex reported getting a suicide hit into her superstructure; no casualties were reported. The carrier Langley reported a near miss by a suicide plane.  The Ticonderoga reported a torpedo exploded off her stern in her wake. November 26, left the area to fuel.

 

December 2, arrived Ulithi and stayed there for nine days getting much needed rest from the long hours spent at GQ.  Of course, we got over to Mog Mog for an occasional beer bust.  December 11, left Ulithi for the Philippines.  December 13, rescued a Langley pilot that had to ditch near us.  We had gained a pretty good reputation for our rescue efforts of downed pilots. December 14, arrived Luzon area for more air strikes on Luzon. December 15, still in Luzon area.  Allied troops made landing on Mindanao.  A report was given on the amount of oil consumed by our Task Force since September 2; it was over billion barrels of oil.  At noon, a torpedo wake was observed by lookouts as passing between us and the Preston just ahead of us.  We made a search for the sub but were unable to make contact.  December 16, still in the Luzon area, but did not have to go to GQ all day.  December 17, left the area to fuel but were unable to do so because of rough seas. December 18, still very rough seas and couldn't fuel.  The destroyer Hull capsized sometime during the past 24 hours losing all hands on board.  December 19, fueled this day in calmer seas.  A CVE fueling with us, but on the opposite side of the tanker serving us had aircraft on her deck overturned and severely damaged by the storm we had just left.  Scuttlebutt had it that two more destroyers (Spruce and Monahan) capsized during the storm losing all hands.

 

December 24, arrived Ulithi and received Christmas mail and goodies from home.  More beer busts on Mog Mog scheduled for the next few days.  Left the harbor to conduct gunnery practice.  One of our 5" shells struck the New Jersey killing one crewmen. December 30, our Skipper was given a General Court-Martial because of the incident involving the New Jersey.  We were not told of the outcome but I expect that he was acquitted as he retained command of the Porterfield.  Left Ulithi.

 

January 3, 1945, about 125 miles off Formosa.  Launched planes to strike targets in the area but, because of increasing bad weather conditions, the planes were recalled to the Task Force.  January 5, fueled while still in the Formosa area.  Bogies kept us at GQ all day.  January 6, now off Northern Luzon with air strikes planned for the area.  We tried fueling from the Washington but heavy seas severed the fueling lines causing us to abandon further fueling attempts that day.  January 8, fueled from tankers during the morning and headed back to the Formosa area later that day.  January 9, received reports that Allied landings were made on Luzon somewhere near Manila.  Scuttlebutt said that we would enter the China Sea that night by going thru the narrow Bashi Channel between Luzon and Formosa.  January 10, entered the China Sea with great concern about being detected while in the narrow Bashi Channel.  Apparently, we got through undetected as no bogies appeared while going thru the channel.  January 11, our planes were sent over Hong Kong to photograph the area. January 12, at 6:00 AM, 110 miles off French Indo China coast and closing to 30 miles to launch air strikes against targets in Camranh Bay. Several ships in the bay were reported sunk or damaged.  January 13, our planes searched the China coast for ships in hiding.  January 14, two large groups of ships were spotted in the Formosa area.  January 15, still in China Sea making reconnaissance flights over the China coast area.  We spotted several bodies floating near the ship and picked up one to identify it.  It was a Japanese pilot; we sewed him in a canvas sack and gave him a military burial at sea.   The sea was so rough that we decided to leave the other bodies we saw floating alone.  January 16, fueling in very rough seas and still in the China Sea.  The fuel hose broke during fueling and caused the ship to be covered with oil.  January 17-18, still in the China Sea and heavy seas with swells causing us to experience several 40 degree plus rolls. These conditions were responsible for some of our destroyers lost in recent months by capsizing.  January 20, left the China Sea passing close to Balintang Island around 9:30 PM.  Bogeys kept us at GQ since sundown.

 

January 21, arrived Formosa area and launched air strikes at dawn to hit targets in the area. Bogeys menacing the Task Force during the day.  At noon, several bombers penetrated our defenses, with some surviving long enough to drop their bombs.  No hits were scored by the bombers.  At 3:15 PM, a suicide bomber got thru the AA flack and crashed into the Ticonderoga’s superstructure putting her out of operation.  In the same attack, two destroyer pickets were attacked by suicide bombers in which one (Maddox) was hit and set ablaze.  At 3:30 PM, the Ticonderoga was burning furiously and beginning to list from all of the water used to fight the fires.  The Task Force is circling the Ticonderoga to afford her more protection against additional attacks.  Within a short time, another carrier (Langley) was hit by a bomb on her hanger deck; the damage did not prevent the Langley from launching and recovering her planes.  The Ticonderoga took another suicide bomber hit within a short time.  Despite her crew manning her AA guns fighting the attacking planes and fighting the fires resulting from the suicide attacks, she had her fires out when darkness set in.  After dark, she left the formation to return to a Navy Yard for repairs.  After dark, the Task Force also left the Formosa area.  Our strikes along the China coast and Formosa area wiped out about 25% of the remaining Jap merchant fleet.

 

January 22, arrived Okinawa Jima to launch air strikes against the area.  Although, we didn't get much rest we weren’t going to give the Japs any breathing room either.  Fueled from the Washington.  January 23, fueled from tankers.  No bogeys disturbed us those last two days. Left the Okinawa area but standing off a few hundred miles awaiting further developments. February 1, arrived Ulithi. February 6, still in Ulithi.  Task Force Command was transferred to Admiral Spruance and renamed Task Force 58.3. Rear Admiral Sherman and his staff came aboard our ship to present our Commanding Officer, Commander Wertzen, with a Bronze Star for services performed as Commanding Officer of the USS Porterfield in offensive operations against the enemy in the Palau, Philippines, Formosa and China Sea Areas during the period August 30 to October 30. 

 

February 10, left Ulithi bound for carrier strikes on Tokyo, which had been free of American harassment since General Doolittle made his raids in 1942. There was scuttlebutt that Iwo Jima D Day is scheduled for February 19. From there, US forces would be able to launch B-29 strikes against the Japanese mainland daily. On two occasions, we had to rescue pilots that had to ditch their planes. On one occasion, the pilot was obviously in distress while in the water. We sent swimmers out to rescue him and prevent him from drowning while our launch was lowered to go out and pick them up.  Both pilots were from the carrier Cowpens and had used up their fuel while waiting to land on their carrier forcing them to ditch in the sea.

 

February 13, still in the Saipan area; fueling up from tankers for the run to Tokyo tomorrow. February 14-15, headed for the Tokyo area; topped off fuel tank from battleships anticipating high speed runs while making our attacks. February 16, about 120 miles from Tokyo, 70 miles off Japanese mainland. Temperature seems very cold to us; 65 degrees F.  For someone that had been hanging around the equator for more than year, 65 degrees was cold!  There was even some hail falling that morning. We went to GQ at dawn expecting enemy plane attacks against the Task Force.  At GQ all day but no enemy attacks.  At one time during the day, we were within 60 miles from Tokyo.  A small group of destroyers was sent out about 25 miles to sink a small picket boat.  Later, two more pickets showed up closer to the Task Force.  All pickets were sunk by destroyers.  Our sister ship, Callaghan, picked up two survivors. February 17, about 4:30 AM, the Task Force went through a group of picket boats with the Porterfield coming within 500 yards of one of them.  The captain issued orders to the 40 mm gun crews to open fire on them, but apparently the gunners were not wearing their headphones or they were all asleep because we did not fire on the picket. However, it was sunk by the destroyer tailing behind us with only one picket in the group returning any fire. The "Old Man" was so mad that they say his face glowed red while chewing out the Gunnery Officer.

 

February 19, arrived Iwo Jima area. The Task Force carrier planes giving air support for the landings beginning there that day.  A report about the picket that returned fire the day before indicates that the destroyer Dortch was hit, killing 3 men and wounding 7 others. Also announced were the results of our raids on Tokyo:  332 planes shot down, 177 destroyed on the airfields; ships sunk in Tokyo Harbor; 1 DD, 2 DE, 1 AK, 1 CL and 20 ships of various kinds damaged.  Radio Tokyo claims that we hit only schools, hospitals and churches.

 

February 21, somewhere between the Volcanic and Bonin Islands, a bogey got through the screen around sunset.  The Porterfield opened fire on it as it was closest to us.  It was believed that it dropped some tinfoil which caused our radar to lock in on the tinfoil and let the plane escape.  Some claim that we shot down the plane and saw it splash; others claim we shot up the tinfoil. Nevertheless, we received credit for shooting down another enemy plane.  February 23, fueled from tanker group and headed back to the Tokyo area.  Seas were pretty rough. February 24, topped off fuel from the New Jersey.  Seas were still pretty rough but didn't inhibit fueling.  Weather still seemed quite cold to us. Launched air strikes on Tokyo again. February 25, launched air strikes but weather was so bad that the planes were recalled before reaching their target areas. Left the area.

 

February 26, went to GQ at 3:00 AM for surface defense.  We opened fire on an enemy picket.  The picket returned fire, hitting our gunnery fire control director and killing the Gunnery Officer nearby.  Other hits were scored on our Radio Shack, knocking out several radio units. Some hits in the Officer's Quarters caused a small fire there. The searchlight and one 40 mm gun position were hit, putting both out of commission. Twelve men were wounded . The picket received many hits from us but we did not observe it to sink.  Other ships behind us said that it sunk.  February 28, fueled and left the Task Force to return to Ulithi for repairs.

 

March 1, arrived Ulithi. March 11, still in Ulithi.  Enemy planes attacked shipping in Ulithi harbor.  A suicide plane crashed on the carrier Randolph causing much damage to its flight deck.  Another suicide plane crashed on a small island within the atoll, apparently thinking it to be a ship.  No damage to the island but the Randolph must go to Pearl for repairs. March 21, all battle damages to the Porterfield were repaired. Left Ulithi for Okinawa Jima.

 

OKINAWA INVASION CAMPAIGN

 

March 24, arrived Okinawa Jima.  D Day for Okinawa scheduled for April 1. Alone, the Porterfield moved through narrow channels of outlying islands looking for signs of enemy activity on the islands.  Some of the channels are only a couple hundred yards wide; fortunately for us, the enemy had abandoned these islands as we went by all of them unchallenged.  March 25, opened fire on Keramo Retto at 8:45 AM and fired on the island continuously until 3:00 PM. No enemy fire was returned towards us, although reconnaissance reported numerous gun emplacements within our range of fire.   At nightfall, we moved into one of the picket positions guarding the Task Force and remained at GQ all night. March 26, secured from GQ at 4:00 AM.  The destroyer Kimberly was hit by a bomb released by an enemy dive bomber at about 6:30 AM causing many casualties and much damage to the stern section of the ship.  At 8:00 AM we joined battleships and cruisers in bombarding Okinawa.  Torpedo wakes had been seen and reported by several ships in the area.  Depth charge concussions were heard at various times during the day. No reports of damage to either side concerning the submarine threat. Landings were made on Keramo Retto this date.

 

March 27, at 4:40 AM, a twin engine bomber making a low-level run thru the area struck our air search radar, knocking it into the sea. Apparently, the enemy was unaware of us being in his flight path and we were unaware of his presence in time to open fire on him.  The incident left us without means for finding and identifying aircraft in the area.  Later, in the morning, the Callaghan spotted a periscope and made depth charge attacks on the target.   The Callaghan reported the sub surfaced then rolled over and disappeared.  Debris was found on the surface and the sub was considered as sunk. We patrolled Okinawa about 1000 yards off the coast while the battleships hurled their salvos over us. From our position, we could easily see the gun emplacements, pillboxes, roads, radio towers, etc. on Okinawa. That morning, I saw one of our spotter aircraft get shot down by enemy AA fire.

 

March 28, 7:00 AM,  received reports of enemy torpedo planes making attacks on the Task Force; two enemy planes were reported downed.  Later, a destroyer reported a suicide crashing alongside her; no damage. We moved outside the battleship and cruiser Task Group as a submarine and aircraft screen while the larger ships bombarded the island. Later, we moved back in close proximity to the island as a spotter for the larger ships.   At 5:45 PM, the Callaghan dropped depth charges and observed an oil slick after her attack on the target.  March 29,  we took part in bombarding Okinawa at targets near Toya Town. Also, we provided cover for our underwater demolition teams sent in to survey and destroy underwater hazards along the coastline.  Remained at GQ all day.  Several ships in the area reported suicide plane attacks on them with no reports of damage.  This date we fired more than 4000 rounds of 5 inch and 40 mm shells at Okinawa.

 

March 30, 6:00 AM, at GQ  again, opened fire on a plane closing in on our starboard beam.  Fortunately, we did not hit the plane as it proved friendly.  Without our radar we were hampered in identifying aircraft, either friendly or enemy.  By now we had learned that those who opened fire first were usually left alone.  We moved in close to the island again to provide coverage for the underwater demolition teams. Much enemy submarine activity in the area as many torpedo wakes were observed; I did not hear of any damage reports.  Went alongside an AK to load stores and ammunition. Over 40,000 rounds of 5 inch and 40 mm were loaded; very tiring work; loading ammunition below decks.

 

April 1, 8:00 AM, Marine and Army forces made assault landings on Okinawa Jima. We covered a road junction on the island in case the enemy tried to use it while we were covering it.  By 11:00 AM, our troops had captured the largest of three airfields on the island.   A second airfield had been captured by 6:00 PM.  Our troops were fighting on a 6 mile front about 2 ½ miles inland at dusk. We continued bombarding ahead of our force on Okinawa all during the night.  The West Virginia reported getting hit by a suicide plane sometime during the day; no damage report heard.  During that night, the Task Force was attacked by enemy planes twelve times; no damage reports heard. We sighted 3 mines floating near us and destroyed all with rifle fire. We were lucky to have missed hitting one of them during the night.  Continued bombarding the beaches during the morning.

 

April 3, we and the USS New York were assigned to bombard an area north of Zampa Misaki.  The New York furnished a spotter plane for us.  By 4:00 AM, the spotter said that we had neutralized the area and stopped all enemy activity in the area. Many bogies were in the area which kept us alert for them too. April 4, retired from the area to take on ammunition.  Enemy air attacks were becoming more frequent and kept us at GQ day and night sometimes without a break for over 72 hours.  April 5, back to bombarding Okinawa again; now on the Southern front near the city of Naha, working with a spotter plane attacking targets near Kamiku Town and Machinate Airfield.  The destroyer Newcomb was hit amid ship by a suicide bomber, causing loss  of  her superstructure between Gun 2 and Gun 3, which included all of the bridge, stacks and mid-ship deck houses.  There were many casualties.   The destroyer Lentze received a suicide hit on its fantail, knocking out the steering gear and flooding the after compartments. The destroyers Mullany and Hyman were also hit by suicide planes; no reports on their damage.  The destroyer Morris was hit by a suicide plane below the water line between Guns 1 and 2, which caused her forward magazine to blow up. I also heard that we suffered hits on 2 more destroyers, 1 AK, 2 LSTs and 1 AP during the day.  No reports of which, if any, of the above ships were sunk.

 

April 6, continued bombarding the island throughout the night. Stopped bombardment during the morning but continued patrolling along the coast standing by to give more fire support whenever requested.  No additional requests were received that day. Also, there were no bogey attacks on our position, giving us a much needed rest. April 7, laying off Keramo Retto, screening some of the destroyers that had received suicide hits.  We transferred hot coffee, soup and sandwiches to the Newcomb.  We took aboard some of her wounded and took them with some other men we recovered from the water to a nearby hospital ship.

 

April 8, rejoined Task Force 58 during the morning. Received reports that a large Japanese force was headed towards our position and expected to arrive within striking distance sometime later in the day. We started preparations to meet this threat.  Only one bogey approached the formation that day, which was shot down by a cruiser in the Task Force. Later that night, our carrier planes attacked the approaching enemy force and turned them away from us.  They were no longer considered an immediate threat.  Scuttlebutt reported that it took 8 torpedoes and 8 bombs to sink one of the attacking battleships.  Several enemy cruisers were sunk or damaged from our air attack on them. Apparently, they had no carriers with them as our planes had no enemy air opposition during their attack.

 

April 9, we were ordered to report to the USS Biloxi as a screen for it and to assist with fire support for troops landing on Notobu Peninsula. After the landing, we continued bombardment of the area with our 5 inch guns.  According to reports received, our forces now controlled about two thirds of Okinawa Jima.  April 10, secured from our bombardment task at 3:00 AM.  At 6:30 AM, we were back at GQ from enemy air attacks.  We found ourselves being attacked by an apparent suicide plane coming from a position directly in front of our bow.  About 3000 yards out, he turned around and started another run on us from the same direction. I was on the headphones listening to the men topside speculating on where we might get hit.  First, it appeared that the bridge would be impacted.  Next, the fantail or aft sections would get it, then back to the bridge.  All the time, our guns were blazing away at him but did not seem to deter the pilot's resolve to complete his mission.  Naturally, the excitement in the voices I heard at the time made me extremely anxious, and it was the first time that I can remember getting my life belt and strapping it around my waist. A few moments later, I heard an explosion rumble through the ship; the suicide plane crashed a few yards behind our stern into the sea.  What a relief, but the experience left us all somewhat shaken!  One man reported that something fell from the plane and struck his helmet. Number 2 gun was struck by one of our 20 mm projectiles during the attack and put No. 2 out of action.  The projectile exploded when it struck No. 2 barrel and two men at a nearby 20 mm gun position were injured from the exploding shrapnel.  We were the only ship reporting being attacked that day.  We continued screening operations during the day, then joined another Task Group that night in supporting operations on the eastern edge of Okinawa.

 

April 11, assigned to screen minesweeping operations on the northwestern edge of Okinawa.  We felt a little lonely and vulnerable being alone with the minesweepers, especially since receiving such a near miss the day before.  There were no bogey attacks on our position during the day.  The destroyer Kidd was reported hit by a suicide plane.  That evening, we rejoined the Task Force at the southern end of Okinawa and sortied for retirement during the night.

 

April 12, Intelligence reports said that we could expect heavy attacks from enemy aircraft during the day.  Experience had taught us that their reports were usually pretty accurate.  That morning we were assigned to deliver mail to ships anchored in Hagushi Anchorage.  While in the area, we observed supplies of trucks, tanks, planes and provisions of all kinds covering the sloping hillsides.  It was a comforting sight to see so many supplies available for our forces to use. We returned to the Task Force around noon and could hear on the radio of the preparations being made by the Task Force to defend against the bogeys reported in the area.  We were positioned in the forward most position of the Task Force and found both adjoining positions to us vacant as the bogeys began their attack.  From our position, we could see our air patrols make their attack on the attacking planes. We saw two bogeys splashed just ahead of us.  A few moments later we began firing on a bogey headed in our direction. We observed him seemingly to hesitate as to whether to attack us or the battleship on our rear flank.  He turned away from us and dove on the Idaho.  By now, he was receiving fire from many ships and crashed well short of his target.  Next, low level torpedo planes were observed starting their attack.  Their force consisted of about 10 Jills, Vals, and Kates coming in from our port bow about 10 to 20 feet above the water.  We increased our speed to 30 knots and made a hard right rudder turn to expose them to maximum fire power from us.  One plane received a direct hit from one of our 5 inch guns and crashed immediately.  As they came into the range of our 40 mm guns, two more planes were downed by us. We hit and downed a fourth plane as it passed behind us, but not before he had released his torpedo.  We observed the torpedo passing near us but appeared to be traveling erratically.  We downed four more planes as they passed by us towards other ships in the formation, but two enemy planes got beyond our firing range and headed for other ships in the Task Force.  Those two managed to hit a target in the Task Force.  One launched a torpedo, which hit the destroyer Zellers and another crash dived into a battleship.   We received credit for breaking up the attacking formation and downing 9 planes; all in a period of about 5 minutes and with one of our 5 inch guns disabled.  That night, bogeys attacked the formation dropping flares to illuminate much of the Task Force.  We caused one attacking plane to turn away from our gun fire, but we were unable to confirm a kill.  Five more destroyers were hit by suicide planes.  This made my count of destroyers hit by suicide planes come to 26.

 

April 13, returned to bombarding assignments and screening underwater demolition teams off Ie Shima, a small and heavily populated island a few miles West of Okinawa.  We bombarded the island for about 2 ½ hours.  That afternoon, we returned to Keramo Retto to replenish our ammunition, fuel and provisions. That night, we were positioned to provide star shell illumination and harassing fire on enemy positions as requested by our troops. Later, we were complemented by Marine Commanders on the accuracy of our gunners in hitting the targets requested by them. During the day, we received word that President Roosevelt had died That morning.  Most of us felt sorry about the loss of his leadership. Of course, there were some who were not saddened by his death because it was widely rumored that he knew of the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 before the attack occurred and did nothing to alert the forces there because he wanted an excuse to draw us into the war.

 

April 14, back at Ie Shima with the same mission as we had the day before.  Battleships are laying in barrages further out. D Day for Ie Shima is planned for April 16.  Returned to Keramo  Retto for more ammunition.  April 15, standing by to provide fire support for ground troops on Nago Wan. We received a request to target a cave in the area.  We were provided with a spotter plane to assist us.  Shortly, we scored a hit on the cave and could see men scurrying away from it for cover elsewhere.  We saw the spotter plane make several strafing runs on the enemy soldiers. We stayed in the area providing fire power and illumination during the night.

 

April 16, troops began landing on Ie Shima.  We were stationed off Ie Shima ahead of the landing forces and began our bombardment of the area. Our troops were reported as receiving very little enemy resistance. At noon, we heard a radio report that Germany had surrendered unconditionally and that Russia had declared war on Japan. Later that day, we heard that Ernie Pyle, a noted newspaper correspondent and well liked by the GIs, had been killed while covering the landing on Ie Shima.  That morning, in another area off Okinawa, a large group of bogeys had attacked pickets there.  Four destroyers (Laffey, Pringle, Hobson and Bryant) were hit by suicide bombers.  The Pringle was reported as being sunk. Later, the Laffey was hit with 2 bombs while she was under tow.  Our position was attacked by several planes.  We hit one plane with our 5 inch guns as it approached us and downed it at about 8000 yards.   The other planes turned aside and disappeared.  An ex destroyer (Harding), now a DMS, was hit by a suicide bomber.  It was estimated that there were 100-110 bogeys taking part in those attacks during the day. Our air patrol downed 56 planes and the remaining planes that were downed were hit by our ships.  Unfortunately, many bogeys downed themselves by crashing into our destroyers. That was bad news for our side.

 

April 17, about 2 miles from Basina Misaki, providing fire support for troops in the area.  Later, we were reassigned to provide fire support to troops about ½ mile NE of Manna Kawa, which was receiving heavy fire from the enemy. With the help of an air spotter, we eliminated all effective enemy resistance in that area within a short time. Next, we were assigned to join up with another Task Group in exercises against the enemy on another part of the island. As we approached our new station, our port drive shaft developed excessive vibrations and caused the port engine to be put out of operation.  We then went to Hagushi Anchorage to determine the cause of the vibration.  The anchorage was under a heavy smoke barrage to provide coverage against air strikes to the ships in the anchorage.  Many bogeys flew over the anchorage but made no strikes on the ships anchored there; apparently because of poor visibility.  We wondered why the suicide pilots didn't go down and blindly fly through the anchorage at a low level because they would surely hit something as they flew through the smoke.  The ships wouldn't have been able to fire at them because the planes couldn't be seen through the smoke either.  I suppose the idea never occurred to them because such incidents never happened.  April 18, the engine room force was busy trying to fine the vibration problem and made plans to replace a wiped bearing on the port shaft.  We were ordered to go back out before our work on the shaft was completed.  Our reputation for accurate fire support put pressure on our commanders to get us back out there.  A NW wind at our new fire support station made it difficult for us to navigate on just one engine and keep our ship out of danger of being grounded.  We were then excused to return to the anchorage.

 

April 22, underway at 2:30 PM for Saipan with several DEs and a transport.  April 23, sank a floating mine with our 20 mm guns. April 27, arrived Saipan.  Took on fuel and headed back to Okinawa escorting some AKs and APs.  We heard that the destroyers Morrison and Little had been sunk the day before by suicide bombers.  Also, the destroyer Arron Ward had been hit but did not sink.  The Morrison was a ship in our squadron.  May 1, arrived Okinawa without incident. Assigned to patrol a station South of Naha Town. The next day weather conditions had worsened making it extremely difficult to hold our position on station because we were still with only one engine.   Next, we tried to go along side a tanker to fuel.   It took several attempts to go along side before we finally made it.  Next, we were assigned to patrol an area for possible suicide patrol boat attacks.  Again, the weather made it difficult to maneuver the ship.  Fortunately, we did not meet up with the enemy during our patrol.

 

May 3, left Okinawa to escort the Tennessee to Ulithi. Admiral Spruance and his staff were aboard the Tennessee.  We conducted target practice during our return trip, shooting at sleeves being towed by one of the Tennessee's planes.  The Tennessee's captain commended us on our marksmanship.  Sank another floating mine on the second day out. It failed to explode when we hit it with our gunfire; instead it sank leaving a yellowish color in the sea where it sank.  May 7, arrived Ulithi. A tender inspection team looked at our reduction gear and advised that they could repair it within a few weeks. So, for the next few weeks, we settled down to routine tasks and were permitted to go ashore on beer parties every third or fourth day while in port.  While in Ulithi, we repaired our damaged 5 inch gun barrel with a new replacement and installed a new radar antenna.

 

May 28, Navy and Marine Corps Medals were presented to the 4 men who rescued a downed flyer in February. The Executive Officer was presented with a Presidential Unit Citation.   June 15,  the captain, Commander Wulzen was presented a Silver Star for the engagement with the enemy picket on February 26. Purple Hearts were presented to 13 men who received wounds during the above engagement.   June 20, the reduction gear work had been completed and we prepared to get underway for Okinawa again.  June 28, left Ulithi to escort a convoy bound for Okinawa.  As we left Ulithi harbor we started up the port engine.  Again, it malfunctioned and caused us to return to the harbor.  Further inspection revealed that the reduction gears were so badly damaged that they would have to be repaired in a Navy Yard.  The inspection showed pieces of drill bits and a rat tail file were found inside the gear housing.  This was evidence that supported the theory of sabotage.  Although the gear housing had a padlock on it’s inspection port, it was demonstrated that the parts found within the housing could have been put in through the inspection port cover without removing the lock.

 

July 4, Lt. Commander Fischer replaced Commander Wulzen as Captain of the Porterfield and we were directed to return to the States via Eniwetok and Pearl Harbor.  July 9,  arrived Eniwetok and left the same day.  July 14, turned on running lights 800 miles from Pearl. Arrived Pearl Harbor July 16. The crew was given a beer party but no liberty was allowed in Honolulu.  July 16, left Pearl Harbor for Puget Sound Navy Yard in Bremerton, Washington. We were told that there would be no liberty or leave until the question of sabotage had been answered.  July 20, about two days out of Bremerton.  Uniform of the day was undress blues. Temperature seems cold to most hands despite it being summer. July 22, entered Juan de Fuca Strait at 8:00 PM.

 

July 22, arrived Puget Sound Navy Yard. Purple Hearts were presented to the men wounded in the Okinawa Campaign.  Liberty was granted to all hands except Machinist Mates.  FBI agents came aboard and started their investigation concerning sabotage of the reduction gears.  All hands were interrogated by them several times during the next several weeks.

 

August 4, I was granted 30 days leave and headed for Beaumont.  VJ Day occurred while I was in Beaumont.  September 6, returned from leave.  September 15, most Machinist Mates were allowed liberty but none were granted any leave at that time.  There was one prime suspect as the saboteur but evidence was insufficient to convict him.  The sabotage investigation was abandoned for lack of evidence.

 

September 27, all Navy Yard work had been completed and we left Bremerton for San Diego. September 29, arrived San Diego and tied up to one of the destroyer base docks. It was announced that the ship would be decommissioned there.  Since being commissioned the USS Porterfield had logged 155,000 miles, credited for downing 16 enemy aircraft, 1 surface ship and participated in 9 major operations or engagements plus numerous individual actions.

 

I spent the remaining time of my enlistment (September 1945 to September 1947) decommissioning destroyers in San Diego. July 1947, I was granted about 75 days leave preceding my discharge from the Navy. I moved to Los Angeles and was hired by The Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Company.  I was working there as a telephone installer, in Hollywood, when my enlistment ended in September, 1947.

 

AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

 

BATTLE STARS

 

5.         Marshall Islands (Kwajalein Atoll, Jan - Feb. 1944)

 

6.         New Guinea (Hollinda, April 1944)

 

7.         PaciPacific Raids (Palau, Yap, Ulithi, Woleai, April 1944)

 

8.         Pacific Raids (Truk, Satawan, Ponape, May 1944)

 

9.         Marianas Operation (Saipan, Tinian, Guam, June - August 1944)

 

10.       Philippine Landings (Leyte, Mindoro, Luzon, October 1944 - January 1945)

 

11.       Battle of Philippines (October 1944)

 

12.       Carrier Raids on Tokyo and Iwo Jima Occupation, (February 1945)

 

13.       Okinawa Jima Campaign  (March - May 1945)

 

 

PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN DURING DECOMMISSIONING IN 1946