SECOND BATTLE OF THE SOLOMON SEA

(USN Title: Battle of Eastern Solomons)

A Battle History of THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVY (1941-1945) by Paul S. Dull, Chapter 14

 

23-25 August, 1942

   For the second Battle of the Solomon Sea, the Japanese had assembled a mighty array of fifty-eight ships, with 177 carrier-based planes. In turn, the U.S. Navy, although it had only thirty ships, had 259 planes. This plane advantage was reduced when the heavy carrier Wasp with 83 planes was sent south on 23 August to take on oil, and was therefore not involved in the battle; thus the Japanese had 177 planes, the U.S. Navy 176. It was a peculiar sort of battle, resembling a match between two overly cautious chess players: one player lost a knight and a pawn, but endangered the other's queen; then both players quit the game.

    Yamamoto had two purposes in mind in preparing for this battle. The Japanese Army's situation on Guadalcanal was critical, and major reinforcements were desperately needed. These could not be brought in without serious risk as long as the U.S. Pacific Fleet in the Southwest Pacific ex&sted. The U.S. Navy also supplied planes and fuel for Henderson Field, and supplies and reinforcements for the Marines. The first objective, then, was to destry the U.S. Pacific Fleet in the area, which would be accomplished by sinking the U.S. carriers, using Nagumo's carrier planes. The Vanguard Force of Rear Admiral Hiroaki Abe could protect the Shokaku and Zuikaku against any enemy carrier strikes. After that, the Japanese carrier planes, aided by the Vanguard Force and then by Admiral Kondo's powerful Main Body, Support Force (and, if needed, by the battleship Yamato's devastating 18-inch guns) could mop up any of the American naval force that remained. Then Guadalcanal's Henderson Field could be put out of action permanently by Nagumo's planes and ships.

    His second objective was to keep the Americans from attacking the Japanese troop convoy with 1,500 reinforcements en route to Guadalcanal. To that end Henderson Field and the American garrison would be subjected to an intensive night bombardment by the Eighth Fleet's four heavy cruisers, while Rear Admiral Raizo Tanaka brought the convoy in to Tassafaronga. To aid in the second objective the light carrier Ryujo with her supporting ships was to be placed 100 miles west of Nagumo's heavy carriers and 190 miles northeast of Guadalcanal. From there her planes could attack Henderson Field. (Morison, Vol. V,p. 87, infers that the Ryujo was set out as "bait" to be located and attcked by U.S. carrier planes, thus disclosing their position; but there is no known evidenue that this was so. The Ryujo had the Japanese Navy's latest heavy cruiser and two good destroyers for protection. The Japanese probably decided to take a calculated risk that the Ryujo could take care of herself.)

    By this strategy, Admiral Yamamoto was again employing the very divisd)on of forces that had contributed so heavily to his defeat at Midway. He seemed incapable of devising a simple battle plan in which all his ships, superior in number, could be brought to bear agaist the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Admiral Nimitz at Pearl Harbor, and the headquarters of the Comander In Chief, South Pacific (COMSOPAC), at Noumea, were fully aware that Admiral Yamamolio was coming out with most of the ships he could throw into battle. The U.S. Navy also began gathering all of its available ships, knowing that this battle was going to be a big one.

    On the morning of 23 August, the Japanese naval forces were headed southeast by south, on a line well to the east of the Solomon Islands. The U.S. Navy fleet on the same morning was on a north-northeasterly course about 150 miles east of Malaita Island, on a course parallel to the Japanese forces. Both dides were cautious, as in all carrier battles.

    The first sighting was made by the Americans, when a reconnaissance plane based at the Santa Cruz Islands reported seeing a troop convoy at 0950. Admiral Fletcher ordered the Saratoga'a planes to find and attack the ships that had been reported. At 1445, the Saratoga launched thirty-one bombers and six torpedo planes. Guadalcanal got the same sighting information and sent out twenty-three planes transport-hunting. Neither group found anything, for Admiral Tanaka, knowing he had been observed, had reversed course; moreover, the weather was bad and visibility poor. The other Japanese forces also reversed course at 1800.

    Admiral Fletcher's Task Force 61 milled around off Malaita Island during the day on 23 August. At 0600 on 24 August, the Japanese forces started south again. On this day the Americans again made the first sighting, when at 0905 a patrol plane from Ndeni Island spotted the Ryujo group heading south, about 260 miles from Task Force 61. The Ryujo was sighted again farther south at 1128, 35 miles closer and still closing range. But at about 1100, Fletcher knew his force too had been "snooped" by a four-engine flying boat. Thereupon, he ordered the Enterprise to launch twenty-three planes at 1230 to cover a 250-mile range across 200 degrees.

    Admiral Fletcher on this morning had problems, not the least of which were atmospheric conditions which made radio reception unreadable at times. 'Ib make matters worse, his flyers cluttered up the air with unnecessary chatter. Although reports of new sightings came in--at 1400, a carrier was reported 60 miles northeast of the Ryujo, at 1430, the Zuikaku and Shokaku were observed, and at 1440 Abe's force was spotted--Fletcher, remembering the failure to find the convoy reported the day before, was still somewhat skeptical; indeed, he probably never did get a complete and accurate plotting of all the Japanese naval forces. But after considerable deliberation, he felt he could no longer ignore reports of a nearby Japanese light carrier, and ordered the Saratoga to launch thirty bonbers and eight torpedo planes. Fletcher was left in a precarious position, should planes from a Japanese heavy carrier attack his force, for he had only fourteen bombers and twelve torpedo planes left for a counterattack. But, remem-bering the Battle of the Coral Sea, he had prudently kept a combat air patrol of fifty-four Wildcat fighters.

    Meanwhile the Ryujo, reaching her assigned position, at 1220 launched a first wave of six attack planes and six Zero fighters bound for Guadalcanal, where they would combine efforts with twin-engine bombers from Rabaul to knock out Henderson Field. AT 1248 another wave of nine fighters was launched. When the Ryujo's planes began to appear on the Task Force ships' radar screen, the infoma-tion was picked up by the Enterprise search force, which made for the raiding Ryujo planes 100 miles ahead of it, rather than go for the carrier from which they must have come. Shortly thereafter, Admiral Fletcher began to receive more information from PBY's and the Enterprise's planes--the Ryujo was located 200 miles away, a large carrier was located 60 miles north of the Ryujo, then at 1430 the Zuikaku and Shokaku were pinpointed 200 miles away. Ten minutes later, the Vanguard Force was located. But the bulk of his planes had already been sent out, and Admiral Fletcher simply did not have enough left for a strong strike. He tried unsuccessfully to divert the Saratoga group from the Ryujo to the Zuikaku and Shokaku; communications had become so difficult that he could not direct and control what was aloft.

    The behavior of Tadao Kato, captain of the Ryujo, during this period was puzzling. After launching his planes, he turned north for an hour, and then at 1330 turned west. Soon thereafter he again reversed course, in order to be at the rendezvous point to recover his planes. During this entire period the Ryu3o had kept her remain-ing fighters on board, although at 1341 her lookouts had reported a search plane. Then at 1351 a B-17 had emerged from the clouds and attempted to boitb the carrier. The Ryujo reacted to this by launching six fighters which chased the B-17 for a few minutes and then returned to cover the carrier. She was again attacked unsuccessfully by B-17s at 1455. Tameichi Hara, who c ded the destroyer Amatsukase in the Ryujo's screen, claims that the Ryujo had seven fighters that could have been used as combat air patrol, but against the B-17s she only launched two, which then returned to their carrier. These seven fighters were not in the air when the Ryujo was attacked by carrier planes. At 1400 her raiding planes signalled to the Ryujo that Guadalcanal had been successfully bombed and the raiding force had lost two fighters and three bombers. Another plane which was unable to return to the Ryujo was ordered to land at Ndemi Island, where the pilot was picked up by the destroyer Mochizuki.

    But the Ryujo would not be afloat to recover her planes, for the Enterprise group had found her, and the Ryujo did not have enough planes for an effective combat air patrol. The initial attack was by thirty dive rs from Saratoga at 1557. According to a report made by Captain Kato, who survived the attack, she was able to evade all the bombs except a near-miss, but suffered a torpedo hit aft on her port side. The screening 'Ibne was also attacked by dive bombers and torpedo planes, but was not damaged. The Ryujo's rudder became jammed, causing her to move in circles; she was aflame along her full length, and was soon listing heavily. Her planes, still aloft from the Guadalcanal raid, were ordered to land at Buka, but they did not have enough gas to do so. The Amatsukaze was ordered alongside as "Abandon Ship" was signalled. Three hundred sur-vivors came on board, the last man being Kato; Her normal complement was 924 men. The Amatsukaze was in grave danger, for if the Ryujo sank while the destroyer was alongside, the carrier would take the Amatsukaze down also, since she had grappling hooks fastened on the carrier, and the personnel were coming on board the destroyer by way of wooden planks. Finally, the Ryujo sank at 2000. Her fouteen planes soon arrived and circled over the rest of the force until they finally splashed in the sea; seven pilots were rescued.

    Now it was the turn of the Japanese to strike back. Task Force 61 had been under con-stant surveillance ever since the Chiuma's float plane had made the first contact. Under the Shokaku's flight leader, the Shokaku and the Zuikaku began sending off planes at 1455: eighteen bombers and four Zero fighters from the Shokaku, nine bombers and six Zero fighters from the Zuikaku. The two U.S. carriers separated into two defensive groups, ten miles apart: the Enterprise, in the middle of a two- mile defensive ring made up of one battleship, two cruisers, and six destroyers; and the Saratoga, simi-larly placed and guarded by two cruisers and five destroyers. Aloft, at a distance of 25 miles, were fifty-three Wildcats as combat air patrol. At 1638 the Enterprise was attacked simultaneously by dive bombers and attack planes. The protective Japanese fighters prevented most of the Wildcats from getting at the Japanese dive bombers. The Japanese planes met with severe antiaircraft fire, but the attack was stubbornly pressed. The Enterprise took her first hit on the after deck elevator, and the bomb tore through to the third deck before exploding. A second bomb scored very close to the initial hit. Then at 1645 a third bomb hit home aft of the carriers island, but the explosion did little damage. Although the Enterprise was burning furiously as the attack was ending, she had suffered no damage to her hull; but she lost seventy-four men, with ninety-five wounded. Although carriers were evolving new techniques of pro-tection, with more antiaircraft guns, and more planes in the combat air patrol, the Ente,rprise's protection had not been enough. The battleship North Carolina also drew the attention of the attacking planes, but suffered no damage. No attack planes carrying torpedoes were observed during this phase of the battle.

    At 1600, the two Japanese carriers launched a second attack, which never discovered Task Force 61, however, due to the flight officer's plotting error--an error which probably saved the Enterprise. At first, the Enterprise worked up a speed of 24 knots and began recovering planes. But because she was so seriously damaged, a domino effect began--one malfunction led to another, and finally the carrier's rudder jammed, which made towing impossible. If the second Japanese attack group had discovered her, she would have had no maneuverability. Eventually steering control was restored, where-upon Admiral Fletcher turned south, withdrawing from battle. most of the Enterprise's planes landed at Guadalcanal to bolster further the island's air defenses, and the Wasp, having refueled, was steaming northward to meet Fletcher. Thus, Guadalcanal, even without the Enterprise to feed planes into Henderson Field, still had air pro-tection and a means of getting plane reinforcements.

    When the first Japanese attack group retired to the north, there were still U.S. planes scattered in the air: thirteen bombers and twelve torpedo planes.

    From the Saratoga five torpedo bombers attacked the Main Body, Advance Force of Admiral Kondo, but without result. Two of the dive bombers were more fortunate; at 1740 they spotted the seaplane tender Chitose, which had almost no armor protection. Near-misses set her planes on fire and loosened her port plates, putting her port engine room out of action. Prompt action, however, saved her and she returned to Japan via Truk for repairs. Admiral Kondo, still eager to continue the action, joined the Van-guard Force at 1630 and went searching to the south, hoping to find ships to engage in a night battle. At 2330, finding nothing, he retired to the north. One phase of the battle had ended.

    But the cause of the battle still remained : the Japanese convoy with 1,500 troops, bound for Guadalcanal. Leaving the Shortlands, it was spotted at 0223 on 25 August by an knerican flying boat. The weather worked against the success of the mission, for the moon was bright, although there were scattered clouds. It had been a tough night on Guadalcanal, as most of them were. Planes catapulted from the cruisers covering Tanaka's convoy had bombed Henderson Fiels and the Marine encampment, using anti-personnel fragmentation bombs (nicknamed "daisy cutters" by the Marines). As the troop convoy approached Taivu Point at 0740, the light cruiser Jintsu was in the pro-cess of joining the destroyers Kagero, Isokaze, Kawakaze, and Yayoi, which had also been bombarding Henderson Field. She came under fire from four planes which emerged from the scattered clouds, and took a bomb hit from a carrier plane between her A and B turrets. Her radio shack was ruined, so that her officers could not direct operations. At first, because it was thought that the planes were "friendlies," no ship returned fire. Crewmen on the iintsu feared that the fire would spread to the forward powder magazine, so the captain ordered the magazine flooded. Soon the fires were brought under control.

    While the Jintsu was solving her own problem, others were being created. At 0807 another group of enemy planes attacked, and the largest transport, the Kinryu Maru, in the center of the convoy, received one bomb hit and a severe strafing. At once she was enveloped in flames, which were fed by the ammunition she was carrying, and lost way. The Jintsu's c der, Rear Admiral Raizo Tanaka, at once ordered the Yayoi, Mutsuki, and patrol ships No. 1 and No. 2 to go to the transport's assistance. At the same time, he ordered the other two transports (the Boston Maru and Taifuku Maru) to retire, screened by destroyers Kawakaze and Umikaze and by patrol ships No. 34 and No. 35.

    The Mutsuki was proceeding with the rescue of the Kinryu maru personnel when at 1027 the group was attacked by three B-17s, and the Mutsuki was hit in the engine room. The Kinryu Maru and Mutsuki survivors, including the Matsuki's captain, were picked up, mainly by the Yayoi, which rushed the badly wounded to the naval hospital at Rabaul. The Mutsuki was sunk then by a "friendly" torpedo at 1053 to prevent her fal-ling into American hands.

    The Jintsu and the destroyers Kagero and Suzukaze acted as direct guards to get the convoy out of the range of enemy air power. A little later, the Jintsu was instructed to return to Truk for repairs at once and to transfer the flag to the Susukaze. Admiral Yamamoto, seeing the danger to the convoy, ordered the Zuikake, accompanied by three destroyers, to provide air cover, at the same time, twenty-two land-based planes and thirteen Zero fighters attacked Guadalcanal. The convoy made it back to the Shortlands safely. Admiral Yamamoto ordered that the troops in the convoy be sent back to Guadalcanal at once, in smaller and swifter ships. Meanwhile, the Outer South Seas Force Headquarters ordered two destroyers to perform a nightly bombardment of Guadalcanal.

    It is difficult to understand Yamamoto's thinking in this battle. He had brought out a large number of ships; he had lost the Ryujo, had seen the Chitose damaged, but his two heavy carriers had come through unscathed. Only the poor flight direction of the last wave of Japanese plane attackers robbed the Japanese of a more heady victory. Yet, he cautiously withdrew his main forces to the north and did not return to the attack. If he was seeking a battle to destroy the U.S. in the Southwest Pacific and had initially risked his two heavy carriers to do so, then why, after he knew that the Enterprise had been seriously damaged and his pilots reported only one U.S. carrier left, did he retire?

    His Vanguard Force, with Kondo's Main Body, did dash south for a night Battle but then immediately returned. Surely a study of American tactics would have alerted the Japanese to the tendency of American carriers to disengage at night when enemy ships were likely to be looking for them. The U.S. fleet carriers could not use their planes at night and were vulnerable to ship's guns; moreover, their protective war-ship screen was outnumbered by the Japanese forces. Nevertheless, the Eighth Fleet's four cruisers did not bombard Guadalcanal, but sent in only their float planes, carrying light bombs. Tanaka's daylight convoy, being unprotected suffered severe damage. Were thoughts of Midway inhibiting Admiral Yamamoto?

    On the American side, there was timidity too--but there was good reason for it. At least one carrier had to be afloat to serve as a steppingstone south of Guadalcanal to feed Henderson Field. The worst marks for the U.S. Navy, as at Midway, were for lack of proper flight control and abominable radio discipline among pilots. Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher's staff never had a chance to direct the planes in the air. Task Force 61 was, indeed, fortunate to come out of the battle with as little damage as it did.